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1. Introduction
Financial constraints arise from frictions such as information asymmetries that make
external funds more costly than internal funds, sometime prohibitively so. Although
financial constraints are easy to understand on this conceptual level, it remains an
empirical challenge to quantify them. As pointed out by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist
(2014), many of the measures based on accounting data are likely flawed. We contribute
to this literature by developing a novel measure of financial constraints based on textual
analysis. We then revisit the question posed by Lamont et al. (2001) and Whited and
Wu (2006) of whether financial constraints affect stock returns.
Textual analysis looks for evidence of financial constraints where they are directly
discussed—companies’ annual reports. This method is fundamentally different from
other approaches taken in the prior literature, where information about financial con-
straints is extracted from accounting data. The classic example is the sensitivity of
investment to cash flow from Fazzari et al. (1988). By its nature, accounting data only
provides an indirect way of gauging financial constraints because current accounting
standards offer no means for a direct quantification of financial constraints. We cir-
cumvent this problem by looking for relevant information where it is directly available.
Financial constraints are not unidimensional and it is thus naïve to assume that
financial constraints for a given company can be boiled down to a single number. For
example, a company might face constraints raising equity but not debt, while another
company might face the opposite problem. We extend the existing literature on the
effects of financial constraints on stock returns by constructing several measures of
financial constraints that capture different dimensions along which companies can be
constrained. For example, we distinguish between constraints that arise from issuing
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equity versus debt. We thus addresses long-standing conceptual problems of constraints
measures used in the prior literature.
We find that our financial constraints measures do a good job capturing firm char-
acteristics that are typically associated with financial constraints. For example, con-
strained firms are small, have lower cash flow to assets ratios, and pay out fewer divi-
dends. This finding is in contrast to other measures used in the literature. For example,
according to the KZ index, constrained firms are larger than unconstrained ones (Ka-
plan and Zingales, 1997). After our measures pass these initial “sanity checks,” we
continue to investigate their relation to stock returns.
To this end, we build portfolios by sorting on our financial constraints measures.
We find that excess returns are higher for financially constrained firms, suggesting
that investors need compensation for financial constraints risk (Whited and Wu, 2006).
We then regress these portfolios on well-known risk-factors and find that alphas are
increasing in financial constraints, thus confirming our previous result in a more rigorous
setting.
The next question we ask is whether this risk premium is only concentrated in small
stocks. We find that this is not the case. Instead, the largest and most liquid stocks
are the ones most affected by financial constraints risk. In particular, when double-
sorting portfolios on financial constraints and size, we find the largest excess returns for
constrained mid-caps and constrained large-caps, but not for constrained small-caps.
Thus, our results are not driven by illiquid stocks. Instead, a trading strategy using
financial constraints is most profitable for liquid stocks.
To further investigate financial constraints risk, we construct a zero-cost financial
constraints factor by replacing the book-to-market ratio with our financial constraints
measure in the construction of the standard HML factor. We then “average out” the
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size quantiles to ensure that we are picking up variation in financial constraints and
not size (Fama and French, 1993; Whited and Wu, 2006). Regressing this factor on the
market, the Fama-French factors, and momentum yields an annualized alpha of 7.1%
for one of our financial constraints measures.
To capture the different aspects of financial constraints, we use three different tex-
tual measures. On a conceptual level, the first measure is most closely related to the
measures used in the prior literature. Its intention is to capture financial constraints in
a general way, without being specific about the source of the constraints. In contrast,
the second and third measures capture sources for financing frictions. In particular, ex-
tending Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014), we construct constraints measures that capture
financial frictions from issuing equity, debt, or both.
Of all three measures, the constraints measure for debt appears to be most important
for financial constraints risk. The annualized excess returns for a zero-cost factor are
6.7% for debt, 0.1% for equity, and 4.6% for the general constraints measure. This result
means that stock returns react least to equity-issuance constraints risk and most to
debt-issuance constraints risk. In other words, the stock market is not overly concerned
about firms’ capacities to raise money through the stock market and instead prices their
ability to raise money in debt markets. This result makes intuitive sense inasmuch as
equity issuances are largely rare events (DeAngelo et al., 2010).
This paper is most closely related to Lamont et al. (2001), Whited and Wu (2006),
and Gomes et al. (2006), who also explore the impact of financial constraints on stock
returns. The key difference between this earlier work and our study is our use of a
constraints measure that is based on textual analysis of SEC filings.
A related but distinct literature is the one on financial distress and stock returns
(Griffin and Lemmon, 2002; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Campbell et al., 2008; Chava and
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Purnanandam, 2010; Garlappi and Yan, 2011). The difference between this literature
and our work is that financial constraints typically occur in fast-growing and often
young companies that have good investment projects, but yet struggle to find sufficient
funding. In contrast, distressed companies are near or in bankruptcy and struggle
because they typically lack good investment projects.
In a larger context, this paper is embedded in the literature on financial constraints.
These constraints are important because they are related to capital structure (Korajczyk
and Levy, 2003), cash (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010), corporate goodness (Hong et al.,
2012), cost of capital (Campbell et al., 2012), entrepreneurship (Kerr and Nanda, 2009),
financial development and growth (Love, 2003; Desai et al., 2008), innovation (Brown
et al., 2009; Li, 2011; Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013), investment (Whited, 1992;
Erickson and Whited, 2000; Marquez and Yavuz, 2013), mergers and acquisitions (Liao,
2014; Erel et al., 2014), and taxes (Law and Mills, 2014).
Because being financially constrained is not a black and white issue, as noted above,
measuring and quantifying financial constraints is empirically challenging. Further, as
described in Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2014), no consensus has yet to emerge in
the literature. Prior studies have considered investment-cash flow sensitivities (Faz-
zari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) and extensions thereof (Gatchev et al.,
2010), firm size and age (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010), structural estimation (Whited and
Wu, 2006; Lin et al., 2011; Karaivanov and Townsend, 2014), and textual information
(Bodnaruk et al., 2013; Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2014).
In relation to these last papers, our paper builds upon and extends the literature
on textual analysis of companies’ official corporate disclosures. Textual analysis of
these disclosures faces several empirical challenges because traditional word lists from
psychological dictionaries have limited power capturing the content of these disclosures
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(Loughran and McDonald, 2011) and it is difficult to extract value-relevant information
because of low readability (Loughran and McDonald, 2014). Such difficulties notwith-
standing, corporate disclosures contain valuation-relevant information during IPOs (Je-
gadeesh and Wu, 2013; Loughran and McDonald, 2013), information about financial
constraints (Bodnaruk et al., 2013; Hoberg and Maksimovic, 2014), and they dominate
earnings surprises (Price et al., 2012).
Our paper is most closely related to Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014) in that we both
use textual analysis to obtain measures of financial constraints. However, that paper
uses measures of financial constraints to study investment and security issuance. We
use a closely related measure to understand stock returns.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We describe the data and
the textual constraints measures in Section 2, present the results in Section 3, run
robustness checks in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
2. Data
The following Section 2.1 provides an overview about our data sources and how we
screen the data. We then describe how we construct the textual financial constraints
measure in Section 2.2.
2.1. Data Sources and Data Screens
We combine data from three sources: Compustat, the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), and the EDGAR database from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC). For Compustat, we begin with all observations in the Compustat North
America Fundamentals Quarterly database between January 1, 1994 and December 31,
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2010. Following Whited and Wu (2006), we apply the following screens. We omit firms
with SIC classification between 4900 and 4999 and between 6000 and 6999 to omit regu-
lated and financial firms. To eliminate coding errors, we delete firms that report smaller
total debt than short-term debt (DLCQ > DLTTQ). If a firm experiences a merger
that accounts for more than 15% of the book value of its assets (AQCQ > 0.15∗ATQ),
we delete it. Firms with less than eight consecutive quarters get dropped. We delete
firms that have more than two consecutive quarters of negative sales growth to filter out
companies that are in financial distress, since we want to consider firms that face ex-
ternal financial constraints but are not distressed. Finally, we exclude firm-quarters for
which total assets (ATQ), the gross capital stock (PSTKQ+CSTKQ) or sales (SALEQ)
are zero or negative. For all firms that survive these screens, we obtain monthly stock
market data from the CRSP Monthly Stock File. We then merge CRSP with Com-
pustat. In particular, for each firm-month in CRSP, add the most recent Compustat
observation from the past, without any look-ahead bias. This is the same principle as
in Fama and French (1993), adapted for quarterly (instead of yearly) accounting data.
From EDGAR we download all filings of Form 10-K that are available from the
beginning of 1994 until the end of 2010. Following Li (2010), we extract the MD&A
section from each 10-K filing, since the MD&A contains the a narrative explanation
of the past performance of the firm, its financial condition, and its future prospects.
As such, the MD&A is the part of the 10-K filing that most likely captures the tex-
tual information we are looking for, i.e. textual information about potential financial
constraints.
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2.2. Constructing the Textual Financial Constraints Measure
The construction of the textual financial constraints measure is done in three steps:
preprocessing of each MD&A, classifying each MD&A, and the selection of appropriate
training samples. Each step is discussed in detail in the following sections.
2.2.1. Preprocessing
After extracting the MD&A section from each 10-K filing, we preprocess each MD&A
(Feinerer et al., 2008; Li, 2010). The following preprocessing steps are all standard and
their goal is to make the following textual analysis more precise by reducing unnecessary
noise in the text.
To this end, we remove all characters that are not alphanumeric, we convert all
letters to lowercase, we remove all stop words (e.g. “am” or “and”), and we stem each
document. Stemming means that we reduce inflected or derived words to their stem,
which is a standard procedure from computational linguistics to conflate related words.
Consider for example the following sentence:
Diamond is the latest in a line of U.S. oil companies that have cut its
contract, or posted, prices over the last two days citing weak oil markets.
After stemming, this sentence becomes:
Diamond is the latest in a line of U.S. oil compani that hav cut it contract,
or posted, price over the last two days cit weak oil markets.
Finally, we remove all words that have at least a 99 percentage of occurring zero times
in a document. Of course it is possible that less frequent words have a greater impact,
so we are careful to set the threshold high enough to remove only the very infrequent
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words, while keeping the rest. The purpose of this step is to remove words that appear
so infrequently that their meaning cannot easily be picked up by our textual analysis.
2.2.2. Classifying
For the text classification, we use the naïve Bayes algorithm, which is one of the oldest
and most well-established tools in computational linguistics. In particular, using naïve
Bayes, we model the probability of being financially constraint as a function of the word
count in each MD&A. That is, for each MD&A, we count how often each word appears,
and relate this word count to the financial constraints status as follows:
P (financially constrained) = f(w1, w2, . . . , wn) (1)
where P is a probability measure, the function f represents the naïve Bayes model,
wi counts how often word i appears, and (w1, w2, . . . , wn) is the word count for a
given MD&A. Following this model, for each MD&A (i.e. each firm year), we obtain
a text classification score that shows the probability that this firm year is financially
constrained.
Here it is important to note that we model each MD&A as a “bag-of-words” with
disregard for grammar and word order. The only relevant information is how often a
word appears while the location of the word within the text document is ignored. This
“bag-of-words” approach follows common practice in computational linguistics.
The application of the naïve Bayes model consists of two steps. In the first step,
we estimate model (1) on a relatively small training sample that has relatively few
observations. In the second step, we use the fitted model (1) to predict the financial
constraints status for the whole sample. That is, for each MD&A, we input the word
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count into the right-hand side of the fitted model (1) and thus obtain the probability
that this firm year is financially constrained, based on the MD&A from that firm year.
The reason for this two-step procedure is that for a small training sample, we are
able to obtain reliable observations of financial constraint status (i.e. the left-hand side
of (1)), but not for the whole sample consisting of all MD&As. The basic idea is
that by estimating the model on the small training sample, we pick up the relation
between financial constraints and MD&A word counts from this small training sample.
Assuming that this relation is stable (which has been shown to be true many times in
computational linguistics), we then extrapolate this information on the whole sample
consisting of all MD&As. As can be seen from this description, obtaining a high-quality
training sample is essential to reliably capture financial constraints. We discuss this
aspect of textual analysis in the following section.
2.2.3. Training
The previous section documents the importance of finding a reliable training sample
in order to calculate the financial constraints score for the whole sample. We discuss
this aspect of textual analysis in more detail here. When forming training samples, it
is important to keep in mind that we need reliable observations of the left-hand side
of (1), i.e. financial constraints status. (The observations of the right-hand side of (1)
are readily available by counting the words in the MD&As.) We create three different
types of training samples and discuss each way in turn in the following paragraphs.
In the first way of obtaining a training sample, we search the Dow Jones Factiva
database for news articles that document cases where a firm is financially constrained.
We then find the relevant MD&A of the same firm mentioned in the news and we verify
that this MD&A also mentions the financial constraint status of this firm. While this
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method of obtaining a training sample produces the desired observations of the left-
hand side of (1), it might be viewed as subjective, since we cannot search the whole
Factiva database for financially constrained cases due to the download limits imposed
by Factiva. We thus consider additional ways of obtaining training samples that are
more directly tied to the MD&As (instead of taking the detour through Factiva).
For the second and third way, we follow Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014) to find
firms years that are financially constrained or unconstrained. In particular, Hoberg
and Maksimovic (2014) contains lists of keywords that are about delaying investment
as well as the issuance of various securities such as equity and debt. The basic idea is
that if investment is delayed because there are problems issuing securities (i.e. financing
problems), then keywords that are about delays should show up in the proximity of
keywords that are about security issuance in the MD&A. An important difference is
that Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014) consider whether a given MD&A has any match
in their word lists, while we go further and count how often a word match occurs for
a given MD&A. This approach results in a more fine-grained analysis and allows us
to obtain more precise training samples according to the ranking of the word match
counts. We discuss the specific construction of the training samples next.
Using the lists from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014), we combine keywords from
the two “Delay Lists” with the “Equity Focused List” to find a training sample where
investments are delayed due to a firm’s problems in issuing equity. To ensure that the
delay pertains to equity (and not to something else), we count how often words from the
“Delay Lists” are within twelve words distance of a word from the “Equity Focused List.”
The top one hundred MD&As that score highest according to this criterion are used
as “financially constrained” for the training sample, while the nine hundred MD&As
that score lowest are used as “financially unconstrained” for the training sample. The
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reason for choosing one hundred vs. nine hundred is based on the consideration that
most firms are unconstrained. The results are robust to choosing a different ratio of
constrained vs. unconstrained firms for the training sample. By combining the keywords
from the “Delay Lists” and the “Equity Focused List,” we obtain a training sample that
is about financial constraints relating to equity issuance (the “equity training sample”).
In analogy, by combining keywords from the “Delay Lists” and the “Debt Focused List,”
we obtain an additional training sample that is about financial constraints relating to
debt issuance (the “debt training sample”).
In total, we have three different training samples. The training sample from Factiva
(“Factiva training sample”) is based on a manual screening of news articles, while the
“equity training sample” and the “debt training sample” are based on the keyword lists
from Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014). Using these three training samples, we obtain
three measures of financial constraints, as discussed in Section 2.2.2: one that captures
general financial constraints, one that captures financial constraints relating to the delay
of investment due to problems issuing equity, and one that is about investment delays
due to problems issuing debt.
Figure 1 shows histogram plots of the textual financial constraints measures cor-
responding to the various training samples. The resulting bimodal (double-peaked)
distribution shows that all textual constraints measures are concentrated around zero
and one, with only few observations in between. This should, by definition, not be in-
terpreted as little variation, since both distributional peaks are at the opposite ends of
the distribution, i.e. at zero and one. Instead, it simply means that the textual model in
equation (1), whose left-hand side we plot, is most of the time relatively certain whether
a given firm is financially constrained (FC index close to one) or unconstrained (FC
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index close to zero). In other words, the model seems to be doing a good job at cap-
turing our binary variable of interest (constrained/unconstrained) by having an almost
binary distribution.
Just having an almost binary distribution does of course not necessarily imply that
the textual measures really capture financial constraints. Whether this is indeed the
case is investigated in the following section where we slice various firm characteristics
according to the quantiles of the textual constraints measures. However, because of the
almost binary distribution, it is difficult to split up the measures into more than three
quantiles, and as a consequence, we split up the textual measures into three only.
3. Results
Table 1 shows summary statistics relating financial constraint measures to firm charac-
teristics. Its purpose is to show that our proposed measures are indeed consistent with
characteristics of constrained firms, and, furthermore, to compare our measures to one
of the most widely-used measures of financial constraints, the KZ index (Kaplan and
Zingales, 1997). To this end, the first three panels show our own textual measures of
financial constraints, while the last panel shows the KZ index for comparison.
All of the textual measures of financial constraints show similar patterns, which
are in sharp contrast to the KZ index. Cash flow to assets is smaller for our highly
constrained firms, while for the KZ index cash flow has a hump-shaped pattern. At
the same time, consistent with precautionary savings of financially constrained firms,
cash to assets is larger for our highly constrained firms, while the KZ index implies the
opposite results. According to the textual measures, small firms are more constrained
than large firms, while the KZ index has a hump-shaped pattern, with larger firms
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being more constrained than small firms. There is agreement between the textual
measures and the KZ index for dividends and Tobin’s q. Consistent with all four
measures, q is higher for the constrained firms and dividends are lower. Consistent
with financially constrained firms being smaller growth firms, i.e. firms that have good
investment projects but struggle to raise sufficient outside financing, constrained firms
have lower debt levels according to our textual measures, consistent with the findings
in Whited and Wu (2006). On the other hand, constrained firms according to the
KZ index have higher debt levels, which is more consistent with firms being financially
distressed instead of constrained.
We have shown in Table 1 that the textual financial constraints index is likely to be
more informative about the existence of financial constraints than the KZ index. We
examine next whether financial constraints affect asset returns. In particular, we ask
whether there is a financial constraints factor and whether returns of constrained firms
are subject to common shocks.
As an initial step towards this goal, we form portfolios by sorting the textual financial
constraints measure into three terciles. We follow Whited and Wu (2006) and use top-
40%, middle-20%, and bottom-40%. Table 2 shows the portfolio characteristics. We
find that excess returns increase with financial constraints. This increase is particularly
strong for the Factiva training sample and the debt training sample. Furthermore,
similar to our earlier results, we find that constrained firms tend to be small.
Next we regress the constraints-sorted portfolios on the market factor and the Fama-
French factors, as shown in Table 3. For both the Factiva training sample and the debt
training sample, the alphas are higher when financial constraints are more severe. Like-
wise when building a “high minus low” portfolio based on the financial constraints
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measure, the resulting alphas are significantly positive for the Factiva and debt train-
ing samples, and insignificant for the equity training sample. The high minus low
regressions load positively on SMB, confirming that financially constrained firms tend
to be small. They load negatively on HML, indicating that constrained firms tend to
be growth stocks.
It turns out in Table 3 that all long-only portfolios have positive alphas, indepen-
dent of whether they belong to the portfolio that is long the low, middle, or high
financial constraints quantile. It is important to note that we do not impose an adding-
up constraint that the average alpha equals zero for the long-only portfolios. Instead,
the particular sample of stocks on which we run these regressions has a positive alpha
to begin with, independent of the sorting scheme. To this end, there are two points
to note. First, the distinguishing feature of our sample is that, in order to sort on
financial constraints, we require a non-missing value for the financial constraints mea-
sure. In other words, if we cannot calculate the financial constraints measure for a
given firm-year, e.g. because of a missing Form 10-K or because the MD&A section
cannot be parsed, we exclude all stock returns matching that particular firm-year. This
specific way of constructing the sample, which is necessary in order to sort on finan-
cial constraints, happens to yield a positive alpha to begin with; a long-only portfolio
consisting of all stocks in that sample, without any sorting, has a significantly positive
alpha (untabulated). Second, this result is still consistent with prior studies. If we relax
the requirement of having a matching financial constraints firm-year, and instead use
the larger sample from the basic data screens in Section 2.1, we obtain an insignificant
alpha for a long-only portfolio consisting of all stocks in this particular sample (unt-
abulated), consistent with prior studies. To summarize, we obtain all-positive alphas
because of the specific composition of our sample, which requires a matching textual
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financial constraints measure. However, our main point is not so much that the alphas
are positive, but that they increase in the degree of financial constraints.
The all-positive alphas can be explained by the size effect, which is well-known
to have reversed in our sample period, meaning that larger firms earn higher returns.
Because it is easier to calculate the financial constraints index for larger firms that make
it easier to parse 10-K textual content (e.g. because of better disclosure or corporate
governance), and because we have to discard all firms where we cannot calculate the
textual index, we end up with larger firms in our sample. Specifically, the firms in
our sample are 39% larger than firms in the sample including all stocks from CRSP.
If larger firms earn higher returns, it is therefore not surprising that our sample has a
positive alpha to begin with.
In the next step we double-sort firms based on size and textual financial constraints
into top-40%, middle-20%, and bottom-40%, following Whited and Wu (2006). We then
classify each firm into one of the following nine groups: small size and low index (SL),
small size and middle index (SM), small size and high index (SH), medium size and low
index (ML), medium size and middle index (MM), medium size and high index (MH),
large size and low index (BL), large size and middle index (BM), and finally large size
and high index (BH). Based on this sorting scheme, we calculate monthly portfolio
returns using CRSP data.
Table 4 shows the excess returns for all nine long-only portfolios. An interesting
pattern emerges in the sense that the effect of financial constraints becomes stronger
as the companies get larger. Consider for example the debt training sample, where
this effect is most pronounced. Here the average excess return of big constrained firms
is 2.0% per month while it is 1.3% for big unconstrained firms. This is an increase
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of 0.7 percentage points per month. In contrast, the average excess return of a small
constrained firm is 0.8% while a small unconstrained firm has 0.8%. In other words, the
excess returns of small firms only react very weakly (if at all) to changes in financial
constraints status. In contrast, the excess returns of big firms are more sensitive to
changes in financial constraints, changing by 0.7 percentage points per month. The
results for the remaining two training samples share the same pattern as the debt
training sample, albeit on a smaller scale. The strongest pattern remains for the debt
training sample.
Table 5 further investigates whether this effect is economically significant even
among the largest, most liquid stocks. By double-sorting portfolios on financial con-
straints status as well as size, it regresses zero-cost “high minus low” financial constraints
portfolios on the market and on the Fama-French factors. The alphas are insignificant
for the small subsample, while they are significantly positive for the mid-cap firms and
big firms. This shows that the economic significance is not driven by small firms. In-
stead, the economic significance of financial constraints becomes stronger for the larger
and more liquid stocks. This could reflect that larger firms have better disclosures in
their accounting reports, allowing for a higher precision of textual information, which
our financial constraints measure depends upon.
It should be noted that Table 5 contains long-short portfolios, and no long-only
portfolio as in Table 3. As such, there is no adding-up constraint that the average
alpha has to equal zero. Even if a long-only portfolio consisting of all stocks would
have a zero alpha, there is no conceptual impediment to the long-short portfolios in
Table 5 having all-positive alphas, e.g. for the Factiva and debt training samples.
To further investigate the economic significance of financial constraints, we follow
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Whited and Wu (2006) to add three further portfolios. These portfolios build upon the
double sorted portfolios constructed earlier on page 16, where the double sort is done
on both financial constraints and size. In particular, we form the following portfolios:
HIGHFC = (BH +MH + SH)/3
LOWFC = (BL+ML+ SL)/3
FC = HIGHFC− LOWFC (2)
The HIGHFC portfolio is the equal-weighted average of the most constrained portfolios,
LOWFC is an equal-weighted portfolio of the lowest-constrained firms, and the FC port-
folio is the difference between both. In particular, the FC portfolio is constructed in
the same way as the Fama-French benchmark portfolio, with book-to-market replaced
by the textual financial constraints measures (Fama and French, 1993). FC is thus a
zero-cost factor-mimicking portfolio for financial constraints.
Table 6 shows portfolio characteristics and returns, and exhibits several patterns.
First, it shows that size is negatively correlated with financial constraints. For small-cap
firms, we have more firms that are in the upper quantile of the financial constraints in-
dex, while for large-cap firms there are more firms in the low index quantile. Likewise,
more firms that are in the upper constraints quantile can be found in the small-cap
category than in the large-cap category. Furthermore, the average size of firms in the
HIGHFC portfolio is always smaller than in the LOWFC portfolio. These results are
consistent for all the textual constraints measures based on all training samples. Sec-
ond, constrained firms earn higher excess returns. This pattern holds for all three
constraints measures, and is particularly strong with the debt training sample. Specif-
ically, the average monthly excess return for the FC portfolio with the debt training
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sample is 0.56% with a t-statistic of 2.53. Financially constrained firms thus earn a
positive risk premium, and this risk premium is particularly large and significant for
the debt training sample. This means that financial constraints from delaying invest-
ment because of problems with debt issuance command a high risk premium and these
financing frictions are reflected in stock prices.1 Third, debt-to-assets is higher for
unconstrained firms. This reflects unconstrained firms’ ability to raise debt financing.
The difference in debt-to-assets between constrained and unconstrained firms is largest
for the debt training sample, showing that the textual analysis consistently picks up
the relevant variation in financial constraints. Finally, book-to-market is larger for
unconstrained firms. Value stocks thus tend to be less financially constrained, while
growth stocks are more constrained. Again the difference in book-to-market is largest
for the debt training sample, suggesting that financial frictions from debt issuance play
an important role for value and growth stocks.
Figure 2 shows time series plots of the FC portfolio for all three training samples.
When interpreting these plots, it is important to recognize that, consistent with our
main research question, these are return plots showing how financial constraints are
prized by the stock market. For example, a decrease in these plots may be due to a
decrease in financial constraints, but it may also be due to other reasons such as changes
in risk preferences. Specifically, if the plots decrease after the burst of the dot-com
bubble, it should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence that financial constraints
eased.
The plots show that all portfolios respond more strongly to financial constraints
before the recession in 2001 than immediately afterwards. After the recession in 2001,
1Note that the excess returns are slightly different than in Table 4 because for a given company we
have omitted multiple securities outstanding that have the lowest trading volume. The results stay
robust if we include all securities outstanding.
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the FC portfolio from the equity training sample does not increase a lot, which explains
its low excess return in Table 6. Consistent with capturing equity-related financing
frictions, the only time when the equity FC measure captures returns is exactly during
the growth and collapse of the dot-com bubble, when investors focused largely on equity
financing. On the other hand, the FC portfolios from the Factiva training sample and
the debt training sample increase after the recession in 2001, and thus have much larger
excess returns in Table 6. Interestingly, the financial crisis that started to unfold in
2007 did not have a major effect on the returns of the FC portfolio. A trading strategy
using the textual financial constraints measure would thus have largely been unaffected
by the turmoil during the financial crisis and in fact might even have profited from it,
as can be seen from the increased slope of the portfolio from the debt training sample
during that time.
Tables 7 to 9 test whether returns of financially constrained firms move together.
Controlling for other sources of common variation, we regress the returns of all nine size
and constraints double sorted portfolios on three reference portfolio returns. Following
Whited and Wu (2006), these reference portfolios consist of a proxy for the market
factor (BIG), a proxy for the size factor (SMALL), and the FC factor. In particular,
we define BIG and SMALL as follows:
BIG = (BM +BL+MM +ML)/4
SMALL = (SL+ SM)/2 (3)
The proxy for the market (BIG) consists of the less constrained medium-size and large-
cap firms. The proxy for size (SMALL) consists of the less-constrained small-cap firms.
In all regressions reported in Tables 7 to 9, we exclude the left-hand side portfolio from
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the construction of the right-hand side variables in order to avoid spurious regression
results. Each Table 7 to 9 shows the regression results for the three financial constrains
measures based on the three training samples (Factiva, equity, and debt training sam-
ples).
Tables 7 to 9 show consistently for all three financial constraints measures that
returns of financially constrained firms covary with the returns of other financially
constrained firms. Specifically, for each size category, the loading on FC increases when
the left-hand side variable becomes more constrained. Furthermore, for the Factiva and
debt training samples, the FC loading is positive and significant for medium-constrained
and high-constrained portfolios, while the FC loading is negative and significant for the
least-constrained portfolios. For the equity training sample, the results are qualitatively
the same, with the difference that only the high-constrained portfolios are significant.
These results show that financially constrained firms move together with other firms
that are also constrained. This confirms the existence of a financial constraints factor,
controlling for the market and size effect.
Table 10 examines whether the FC factor reflects other factors such as the market,
size, market-to-book, and momentum. In particular, we regress the FC factor on these
other known empirical factors. If the FC factor is correctly priced, the intercepts of
these regressions should be zero and the R2 should be high.
The FC factor is positively correlated with the market factor and negatively corre-
lated with the book-to-market factor. Consistent with the earlier findings from Table 6,
value stocks are less constrained than growth stocks. The FC factor also loads posi-
tively on the size factor, showing that smaller firms are more likely to be financially
constrained.
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For the Factiva training sample and debt training sample, we find that the inter-
cepts are positive and highly significant. The four-factor model thus cannot correctly
price the FC factor. For the equity training sample, however, the intercept is positive
and insignificant. For all specifications, the R2 falls between 30% and 70%, leaving a
significant portion of the variation of the FC factor unexplained. We thus find that
the FC factor is an anomaly that cannot be explained by the other known empirical
factors.
4. Robustness Checks
It is well known that firms with low investment, low stock issuance, or low debt is-
suance have higher returns.2 Given the construction of our textual financial constraints
measures, it is possible that we are picking up this type of variation instead of financial
constraints. Specifically, by construction, two of our three measures capture textual
content about delays in investment and the issuance of equity and debt, as described
in Section 2.2.3. We therefore validate whether our results are driven by investment,
equity issuance, or debt issuance, or whether our measures contain novel information
about financial constraints.
To this end, we run Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on our measures of
financial constraints and controls (Novy-Marx, 2013). We take a slight departure from
the usual regression setup by specifying, for each firm-month, the dependent variable
as the average monthly excess return over the following three quarters. Because we
2See for example Lyandres et al. (2008), Liu et al. (2009) and Hou et al. (2014) for investment,
Ritter (1991), Ikenberry et al. (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Daniel and Titman (2006), Fama
and French (2008), Pontiff and Woodgate (2008), McLean et al. (2009), Greenwood and Hanson (2012)
for stock issuance, and Lee and Loughran (1998), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), and Baker and
Wurgler (2000) for debt issuance.
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average forward the dependent variable, the resulting regression is still predictive and
there is no look-ahead bias. If markets are efficient and information about financial
constraints is quickly incorporated in stock prices, this setup makes it more difficult for
us to detect a significant result.
After estimating the basic model with financial constraints and the usual controls, we
add investment (capex), stock issuance (stk), and debt issuance (dbt) to the right-hand
side (Brown et al., 2009). If our results are only driven by investment and equity/debt
issuance alone, and not by financial constraints, then the addition of capex, stk, and dbt
should make the financial constraints coefficient insignificant. Table 11 shows that the
opposite is the case. In other words, our financial constraints measure is not subsumed
by investment, stock issuance, or bond issuance and therefore contains novel information
about financial constraints. Specifically, the inclusion of these additional variables does
not make the financial constraint measures insignificant. In case of the Factiva and
debt training samples, the constraints coefficient and test statistic even increase. We
therefore infer that our textual financial constraints measures contain novel information
that is not captured by investment, stock issuance, or bond issuance.
5. Conclusion
We construct a novel measure of financial constraints and investigate whether it impacts
stock returns. In contrast to other measures used in the literature, we find that our
measure consistently captures firm characteristics that are associated with financial
constraints. Furthermore, we are able to capture several different aspects of financial
constraints. For example, depending on whether a firm has difficulties issuing debt or
equity, we are able to construct different “flavors” of our measure that capture this
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difference.
We find that our measure is able to capture prized financial constraints risk in stock
returns. Specifically, financially constrained firms have higher returns. This effect is
not concentrated in small and illiquid firms. Instead, it is most prevalent in large
and liquid stocks, making it easier to form a trading strategy without negative market
impact. A zero-cost factor-mimicking portfolio earns an annualized risk-adjusted excess
return of 7% when trading on financial constraints. Financial constraints from equity
issuance do not command a significant risk premium, while debt issuance constraints
risk is significantly prized.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of firm characteristics sorted on textual financial con-
straints measures and the KZ index. Details of the construction of the training samples are
explained in Section 2.2.3.
Panel A: Sorted by Textual FC Index (Factiva Training Sample)
Unconstrained Constrained
Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.018 0.016 -0.027
Total Assets 3269 2707 833
Debt/Total Assets 0.25 0.24 0.18
Dividends/Total Assets 0.003 0.003 0.001
Cash/Total Assets 0.13 0.14 0.31
Tobin’s q 1.70 1.76 2.79
Text-Based FC Index 0.00 0.08 1.00
KZ Index 0.96 0.95 0.93
Panel B: Sorted by Textual FC Index (Equity Training Sample)
Unconstrained Constrained
Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.009 0.010 -0.012
Total Assets 2635 2480 1693
Debt/Total Assets 0.24 0.24 0.20
Dividends/Total Assets 0.002 0.003 0.002
Cash/Total Assets 0.15 0.15 0.28
Tobin’s q 1.92 1.89 2.44
Text-Based FC Index 0.00 0.00 0.62
KZ Index 0.98 0.97 0.89
Panel C: Sorted by Textual FC Index (Debt Training Sample)
Unconstrained Constrained
Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.015 0.001 -0.008
Total Assets 3938 1898 973
Debt/Total Assets 0.27 0.22 0.18
Dividends/Total Assets 0.003 0.002 0.001
Cash/Total Assets 0.12 0.20 0.27
Tobin’s q 1.71 2.11 2.43
Text-Based FC Index 0.00 0.57 1.00
KZ Index 1.02 0.95 0.87
Panel D: Sorted by KZ Index
Unconstrained Constrained
Cash Flow/Total Assets 0.005 0.014 -0.012
Total Assets 1216 3570 2023
Debt/Total Assets 0.03 0.18 0.45
Dividends/Total Assets 0.004 0.002 0.001
Cash/Total Assets 0.34 0.13 0.11
Tobin’s q 1.77 1.89 2.59
Text-Based FC Index 0.62 0.46 0.48
KZ Index -0.00 0.86 1.98
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Table 2: Portfolio Characteristics
This table shows value-weighted portfolio characteristics when sorting on the textual financial
constraints measure. Each panel shows the average values of the financial constraints measure,
monthly excess returns (long-only), size (i.e. market equity), book-to-market, and the average
number of stocks in the portfolio. The values are split up according to the percentiles of
the constraints measure. The different panels correspond to the training samples, which are
explained in Section 2.2.3.
Panel A: Factiva Training Sample
FC r − rf Size B/M # Stocks
FC.Low 0.001 1.41 76726 0.95 810
FC.Mid 0.047 1.35 69497 0.94 404
FC.High 0.752 1.85 49444 0.69 809
Panel B: Equity Training Sample
FC r − rf Size B/M # Stocks
FC.Low 0.001 1.52 74103 0.93 810
FC.Mid 0.001 1.52 74022 0.92 404
FC.High 0.412 1.45 58823 0.81 809
Panel C: Debt Training Sample
FC r − rf Size B/M # Stocks
FC.Low 0.006 1.28 77411 0.98 810
FC.Mid 0.448 1.62 55676 0.84 404
FC.High 0.963 1.98 54612 0.67 809
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Table 3: Portfolios Sorted on Textual Financial Constraints Measure
This table shows regressions of value-weighted portfolios sorted on the textual financial con-
straints measure. The different panels correspond to the training samples, which are ex-
plained in Section 2.2.3. Columns one to three are long-only portfolios for different financial
constraints quantiles. Column four shows a portfolio that is long the constrained and short
the unconstrained quantile. “# Stocks” shows the average number of stocks in the portfo-
lio serving as the dependent variable. Numbers in brackets show t-statistics. Stars indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Panel A: Factiva Training Sample
FC.Low FC.Mid FC.High High-Low
α 0.0096∗∗∗ 0.0092∗∗∗ 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗
(8.6779) (7.1106) (8.0417) (2.2017)
rmkt − rf 0.9534∗∗∗ 0.8687∗∗∗ 1.0902∗∗∗ 0.1368∗∗∗
(39.5196) (30.5714) (28.4648) (3.0534)
SMB −0.1358∗∗∗ 0.0378 0.2666∗∗∗ 0.4023∗∗∗
(−4.1998) (0.9917) (5.1941) (6.7010)
HML 0.0539 −0.0337 −0.6040∗∗∗ −0.6579∗∗∗
(1.5805) (−0.8386) (−11.1520) (−10.3835)
R2 0.8902 0.8416 0.8741 0.5880
Num. obs. 203 203 203 203
# Stocks 810 404 809 1619
Panel B: Equity Training Sample
FC.Low FC.Mid FC.High High-Low
α 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ −0.0004
(9.6725) (6.6801) (8.9734) (−0.2760)
rmkt − rf 0.9739∗∗∗ 0.9213∗∗∗ 0.9564∗∗∗ −0.0175
(40.3804) (26.0747) (38.2738) (−0.5339)
SMB −0.0597∗ 0.0333 0.0635∗ 0.1233∗∗∗
(−1.8488) (0.7029) (1.8970) (2.8034)
HML −0.0584∗ −0.0796 −0.2216∗∗∗ −0.1632∗∗∗
(−1.7127) (−1.5928) (−6.2722) (−3.5175)
R2 0.8999 0.7973 0.9025 0.1362
Num. obs. 203 203 203 203
# Stocks 810 404 809 1619
Panel C: Debt Training Sample
FC.Low FC.Mid FC.High High-Low
α 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(8.6618) (6.5203) (8.3940) (3.4430)
rmkt − rf 0.9203∗∗∗ 0.9705∗∗∗ 1.0840∗∗∗ 0.1637∗∗∗
(43.7064) (24.5754) (27.3652) (3.7540)
SMB −0.1358∗∗∗ 0.2965∗∗∗ 0.2208∗∗∗ 0.3566∗∗∗
(−4.8118) (5.6040) (4.1603) (6.1035)
HML 0.0676∗∗ −0.3957∗∗∗ −0.4727∗∗∗ −0.5403∗∗∗
(2.2711) (−7.0868) (−8.4390) (−8.7638)
R2 0.9080 0.8295 0.8526 0.5368
Num. obs. 203 203 203 203
# Stocks 810 404 809 1619
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Table 4: Excess Returns of Double Sorts on Financial Constraints and Size
This table shows monthly excess returns of value-weighted long-only portfolios that are double
sorted on the textual financial constraints measure and size (i.e. market equity). The different
panels correspond to the training samples, which are explained in Section 2.2.3.
Panel A: Factiva Training Sample
FC.Low FC.Mid FC.High
Small 0.816 0.679 0.875
Medium 1.253 1.431 1.956
Big 1.416 1.362 1.875
Panel B: Equity Training Sample
FC.Low FC.Mid FC.High
Small 0.966 0.817 0.694
Medium 1.526 1.346 1.846
Big 1.526 1.489 1.455
Panel C: Debt Training Sample
FC.Low FC.Mid FC.High
Small 0.831 0.904 0.804
Medium 1.319 1.640 1.902
Big 1.282 1.651 2.007
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Table 5: Double Sorts on Financial Constraints and Size
This table shows regressions of value-weighted portfolios that are double sorted on the textual
financial constraints measure and size (i.e. market equity). Each column shows a portfolio that
is long the constrained and short the unconstrained quantile, and different columns correspond
to different size subgroups. The different panels correspond to the training samples, which are
explained in Section 2.2.3. “# Stocks” shows the average number of stocks in the portfolio
serving as the dependent variable. Numbers in brackets show t-statistics. Stars indicate
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Panel A: Factiva Training Sample
FCHML (Small) FCHML (Medium) FCHML (Big)
α 0.0009 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗
(0.3534) (2.9780) (2.3087)
rmkt − rf 0.1661∗∗∗ 0.2324∗∗∗ 0.1309∗∗∗
(3.1088) (4.3270) (2.8366)
SMB 0.2784∗∗∗ 0.3123∗∗∗ 0.3693∗∗∗
(3.8888) (4.3401) (5.9708)
HML −0.6595∗∗∗ −0.8100∗∗∗ −0.6752∗∗∗
(−8.7284) (−10.6654) (−10.3441)
R2 0.4638 0.5636 0.5668
Num. obs. 203 203 203
# Stocks 661 326 631
Panel B: Equity Training Sample
FCHML (Small) FCHML (Medium) FCHML (Big)
α −0.0026 0.0032∗ −0.0004
(−1.4481) (1.6597) (−0.2860)
rmkt − rf 0.0582 0.0587 −0.0205
(1.4592) (1.3867) (−0.6029)
SMB 0.0410 0.1630∗∗∗ 0.1114∗∗
(0.7690) (2.8761) (2.4489)
HML −0.2462∗∗∗ −0.3664∗∗∗ −0.1623∗∗∗
(−4.3767) (−6.1293) (−3.3801)
R2 0.1439 0.2870 0.1180
Num. obs. 202 202 203
# Stocks 655 329 639
Panel C: Debt Training Sample
FCHML (Small) FCHML (Medium) FCHML (Big)
α 0.0006 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗
(0.2744) (3.7553) (3.4602)
rmkt − rf 0.0469 0.0275 0.1636∗∗∗
(1.0172) (0.6281) (3.6150)
SMB 0.0989 0.0741 0.3250∗∗∗
(1.6001) (1.2626) (5.3589)
HML −0.4911∗∗∗ −0.7424∗∗∗ −0.5558∗∗∗
(−7.5287) (−11.9890) (−8.6843)
R2 0.3069 0.4921 0.5119
Num. obs. 203 203 203
# Stocks 638 321 661
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Table 6: Portfolio Characteristics and Returns
This table provides a summary of portfolio characteristics and portfolio returns. The different
panels correspond to the training samples, which are explained in Section 2.2.3. Numbers in
brackets show t-statistics. Stars indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Value weighted Equal weighted
Category
label
Number
of firms
Excess
returns D/A B/M Size
Excess
returns D/A B/M Size
Panel A: Factiva Training Sample
Small-cap firms
Low index SL 288 0.83 0.25 3.53 0.12 0.19 0.26 5.01 0.08
Middle index SM 155 0.67 0.24 3.25 0.12 0.06 0.25 4.58 0.08
High index SH 406 0.88 0.19 1.97 0.12 -0.05 0.21 3.09 0.08
Mid-cap firms
Low index ML 162 1.30 0.24 1.99 0.38 1.26 0.24 2.06 0.36
Middle index MM 82 1.41 0.23 1.91 0.38 1.42 0.23 1.98 0.35
High index MH 179 1.96 0.18 1.17 0.38 1.84 0.18 1.21 0.35
Large-cap firms
Low index BL 398 1.45 0.23 0.97 76.56 1.52 0.25 1.31 7.60
Middle index BM 187 1.38 0.23 0.94 69.91 1.61 0.25 1.26 7.45
High index BH 263 1.88 0.17 0.67 52.44 2.33 0.19 0.89 5.54
HIGHFC 1.57 0.18 1.27 17.64 1.37 0.19 1.73 1.99
LOWFC 1.19 0.24 2.16 25.69 0.99 0.25 2.79 2.68
FC 0.38 -0.06 -0.89 -8.05 0.38 -0.06 -1.06 -0.69
t-stat of FC 1.21 1.15
Panel B: Equity Training Sample
Small-cap firms
Low index SL 327 0.86 0.24 3.16 0.12 0.07 0.25 4.48 0.08
Middle index SM 165 0.78 0.23 3.05 0.12 -0.10 0.25 4.24 0.08
High index SH 356 0.71 0.20 2.24 0.12 -0.01 0.21 3.45 0.08
Mid-cap firms
Low index ML 161 1.52 0.23 1.82 0.38 1.48 0.23 1.88 0.36
Middle index MM 80 1.29 0.23 1.84 0.38 1.25 0.23 1.90 0.36
High index MH 182 1.83 0.19 1.38 0.37 1.76 0.19 1.43 0.35
Large-cap firms
Low index BL 358 1.58 0.23 0.93 73.94 1.72 0.24 1.25 7.22
Middle index BM 179 1.48 0.23 0.92 75.62 1.67 0.24 1.23 7.30
High index BH 310 1.46 0.21 0.82 60.46 1.95 0.22 1.03 6.41
HIGHFC 1.33 0.20 1.48 20.32 1.23 0.21 1.97 2.28
LOWFC 1.32 0.23 1.97 24.81 1.09 0.24 2.53 2.55
FC 0.01 -0.03 -0.49 -4.49 0.14 -0.03 -0.57 -0.27
t-stat of FC 0.06 0.94
Panel C: Debt Training Sample
Small-cap firms
Low index SL 273 0.64 0.27 4.18 0.12 -0.09 0.28 5.99 0.08
Middle index SM 180 0.79 0.22 2.65 0.12 0.16 0.23 3.78 0.08
High index SH 394 0.89 0.19 1.82 0.12 0.01 0.20 2.77 0.08
Mid-cap firms
Low index ML 153 1.25 0.26 2.28 0.38 1.24 0.26 2.36 0.36
Middle index MM 87 1.70 0.21 1.57 0.38 1.63 0.21 1.64 0.36
High index MH 184 1.87 0.17 1.11 0.37 1.78 0.17 1.14 0.35
Large-cap firms
Low index BL 420 1.31 0.25 0.99 76.98 1.39 0.26 1.40 8.46
Middle index BM 157 1.63 0.20 0.84 58.77 1.92 0.22 1.09 6.20
High index BH 269 2.12 0.15 0.63 56.56 2.40 0.18 0.82 4.91
HIGHFC 1.63 0.17 1.19 19.02 1.40 0.18 1.58 1.78
LOWFC 1.07 0.26 2.48 25.83 0.85 0.27 3.25 2.96
FC 0.56 -0.09 -1.29 -6.81 0.55 -0.08 -1.67 -1.18
t-stat of FC 2.53 2.45
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Table 10: Relating the Financial Constraints Factor to the Four-Factor Model
This table shows regressions of the FC factor on the market, the Fama-French factors, and
the momentum factor. The different panels correspond to the training samples, which are
explained in Section 2.2.3. Numbers in brackets show t-statistics. Stars indicate significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Dependent variable Constant Market SMB HML Momentum R2
Panel A: Factiva Training Sample
Value-weighted FC factor 0.0043?? 0.1729??? 0.3213??? -0.7138??? 0.6574
(2.4000) (4.4100) (6.1200) (-12.8800)
Value-weighted FC factor 0.0050??? 0.1340??? 0.3344??? -0.7445??? -0.0905??? 0.6698
(2.8000) (3.2600) (6.4400) (-13.3700) (-2.7300)
Equal-weighted FC factor 0.0042?? 0.1781??? 0.3915??? -0.7370??? 0.6817
(2.3200) (4.4600) (7.3200) (-13.0600)
Equal-weighted FC factor 0.0050??? 0.1335??? 0.4065??? -0.7722??? -0.1037??? 0.6963
(2.7800) (3.2000) (7.7300) (-13.6900) (-3.0900)
Panel B: Equity Training Sample
Value-weighted FC factor 0.0001 0.0354 0.1029??? -0.2507??? 0.3100
(0.0698) (1.3329) (2.8868) (-6.6657)
Value-weighted FC factor 0.0004 0.0188 0.1085??? -0.2639??? -0.0388? 0.3200
(0.3081) (0.6645) (3.0460) (-6.9042) (-1.7057)
Equal-weighted FC factor 0.0013 0.0528?? 0.1566??? -0.2898??? 0.4271
(1.0699) (2.0276) (4.4907) (-7.8757)
Equal-weighted FC factor 0.0014 0.0442 0.1595??? -0.2966??? -0.0200 0.4294
(1.1837) (1.5909) (4.5518) (-7.8897) (-0.8931)
Panel C: Debt Training Sample
Value-weighted FC factor 0.0059??? 0.0791??? 0.1824??? -0.5779??? 0.6225
(4.2891) (2.6050) (4.4806) (-13.4523)
Value-weighted FC factor 0.0060??? 0.0754?? 0.1837??? -0.5809??? -0.0088 0.6227
(4.2845) (2.3210) (4.4825) (-13.2130) (-0.3366)
Equal-weighted FC factor 0.0060??? 0.0530? 0.2138??? -0.6039??? 0.6527
(4.3913) (1.7839) (5.3711) (-14.3752)
Equal-weighted FC factor 0.0061??? 0.0464 0.2160??? -0.6091??? -0.0153 0.6533
(4.4247) (1.4632) (5.3947) (-14.1763) (-0.5975)
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Table 11: Investment, New Stock Issues, and New Bond Issues Do Not Subsume the
Financial Constraints Measure
This table shows Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly stock returns on individual firm char-
acteristics. The columns are grouped by the training samples (“TS” in the column headers
below) that are described in Section 2.2.3. The dependent variable is, for each firm-month,
the average monthly excess return over the following three quarters. Independent variables
are the financial constraints measure (FC, described in Section 2.2), the book-to-market ra-
tio (log(b/e)), size (log(me)), past performance measured at horizons of one month (r1,0)
and twelve to two months (r12,2), capital expenditures (capex=CAPXQ/lag(ATQ)), net cash
raised from stock issues (stk=(SSTKQ−PRSTKCQ)/lag(ATQ)), and net new long-term debt
(dbt=(DLTISQ−DLTRQ)/lag(ATQ)). Because of poorer data quality from SEC’s EDGAR
database, we discard observations on or before December 1997. Independent variables are
trimmed at the 1% and 99% levels. Slope coefficients are multiplied by 100 for better read-
ability. Numbers in brackets show t-statistics. Stars indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
Factiva TS Factiva TS Equity TS Equity TS Debt TS Debt TS
FC 0.22∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(2.02) (2.18) (3.10) (2.93) (1.91) (2.69)
log(b/m) 0.02 −0.03 0.00 −0.05 0.00 −0.04
(0.32) (−0.56) (0.02) (−0.86) (0.07) (−0.67)
log(me) −0.18∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗∗
(−5.78) (−6.02) (−5.47) (−5.70) (−5.43) (−5.58)
r1,0 −0.44∗ −0.52∗∗ −0.44∗ −0.50∗∗ −0.43∗ −0.50∗∗
(−1.85) (−2.26) (−1.77) (−2.08) (−1.72) (−2.07)
r12,2 −0.23∗ −0.18 −0.22∗ −0.16 −0.22∗ −0.16
(−1.84) (−1.45) (−1.65) (−1.26) (−1.65) (−1.23)
capex −7.32∗∗∗ −7.58∗∗∗ −8.14∗∗∗
(−5.03) (−4.95) (−4.75)
stk −1.91∗∗ −1.87∗∗ −1.67∗
(−2.12) (−1.96) (−1.74)
dbt −4.09∗∗∗ −3.93∗∗∗ −4.07∗∗∗
(−8.03) (−7.72) (−7.76)
Num. obs. 256444 192680 256428 192537 256466 192443
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Figure 1: Histograms of Textual Financial Constraints Measures
This figure shows histogram plots of textual financial constraints measures correspond-
ing to various training samples. The training samples are explained in detail in Sec-
tion 2.2.3. Values closer to one (zero) mean that the firm is more (less) financially
constrained.
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Figure 2: Monthly Cross-Sorted Financial Constraints Factor
Different figures correspond to different training samples. Section 2.2.3 explains the training
samples in detail.
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